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I .  INTRODUCTION  
Three years after its enactment, the Competition Ordinance of Hong Kong (“Ordinance”) 
is set to come into force on December 14, 2015. This article reviews the conceptually framework 
which the Hong Kong Competition Commission (“HKCC”) will be adopting in assessing resale 
price maintenance (“RPM”), one of the issues at the center of interest in Hong Kong before and 
after the enactment of the Ordinance. 
Emphases will be on the theories of harms, recognized pro-competitive effects of RPM, 
and the role of intra-brand competition relative to inter-brand competition, as contained in the 
official guidelines published in July 2015. This article also provides some historical background 
regarding the occurrence of, and various views about, RPM in Hong Kong in order to fully 
understand its seemingly “near per se illegal” treatment of RPM. 
I I .  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
RPM has received great attention in Hong Kong since the mid-1990s when Hong Kong 
first started discussing introducing competition law, as initiated by the Hong Kong Consumer 
Council. 
In 1996, the Consumer Council received two complaints, one of which was from 
Carrefour, a French supermarket chain. Carrefour had just entered the Hong Kong supermarket 
sector, which was highly concentrated with the two local supermarket chains occupying as much 
as 70 percent of the market. To attract customers, Carrefour adopted an aggressive pricing policy 
where each week a significant number of products were for sale at below the recommended resale 
price (recommended discounted price in some cases). This led to complaints by suppliers to 
Carrefour and threats that supplies would be withheld until Carrefour returned to the agreed 
price level. In some cases these threats were carried out. 
Carrefour supplied the Consumer Council with the names of 22 companies that it 
claimed had put pressure on it to return to recommended prices. Seven of the 22 companies 
contacted by the Consumer Council confirmed having told Carrefour that they would take action 
to enforce RPM.2 
In another complaint, a discounted chain retailer, Pricerite, sold mattresses from several 
suppliers below the recommended resale price, which led a supplier to immediately withhold 
supplies, as well as refuse to deliver to customers who had purchased the under-priced mattresses 
during the promotion period. In its response to the enquiry from the Consumer Council, the 
                                                
1 Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. 
2 Hong Kong Consumer Council, The Practice of Resale Price Maintenance in Hong Kong, available at 
http://www2.consumer.org.hk/p253/resale_e.htm.  
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supplier, which had a network of around 1,000 retail stores in Hong Kong, justified its three-year 
old RPM policy as a strategic initiative to enhance sales and sales service. The supplier also 
restructured its retail network and selected 120 out of the 1,000 outlets to operate as exclusive 
distributors. 
Based on its inquiries with the relevant parties, the Consumer Council concluded in its 
research report that “RPM exists in Hong Kong. … This evidence of the existence of RPM 
provides support for the recommendations made by the Council that Hong Kong should enact a 
comprehensive Competition Law and establish a Competition Authority to enforce it.”3 
In November 2011, the Competition Policy Advisory Group (“COMPAG”) of Hong 
Kong4 received two complaints, alleging that the following practices of some supermarket chains 
and retail chain stores with market power were anticompetitive: 
• Certain supermarket chains were alleged to have pressured a soft drinks supplier not to 
supply soft drinks to a local retailer who had refused to comply with the recommended 
price for a particular soft drink set by the supplier. 
• A supermarket chain was alleged to have pressured a supplier not to supply instant 
noodles of a particular brand to a local retailer if the retailer refused to comply with the 
recommended price for the product set by the supplier. 
• Certain retail chain stores were alleged to have pressured a supplier of electrical 
appliances to request a local retailer (to which the supplier supplied products) to increase 
the price of some of the electrical appliances to the level of the recommended prices set by 
the supplier. 
While none of the three cases were prosecuted due to insufficient information and 
evidence at the time of the complaints—when Hong Kong had not yet established a general 
competition law5—these cases seem to have influenced greatly the attention and position of the 
HKCC toward RPM, as we shall see below. 
I I I .  RPM UNDER THE COMPETITION ORDINANCE: THE FIRST CONDUCT RULE 
After more than a decade-long debate and two rounds of public consultation, Hong Kong 
enacted the Ordinance in 2012. The First Conduct Rule of the Ordinance prohibits 
anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices and decisions having the object or effect of 
preventing, restricting, or distorting competition in Hong Kong. It applies to both horizontal and 
vertical agreements. 
                                                
3 Supra note 2. 
4 Chaired by the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong, COMPAG was established in December 1997 to provide a 
high-level and dedicated forum to review competition-related issues in Hong Kong. It promulgated a Statement on 
Competition Policy in May 1998 to provide an overarching policy framework to guide sector-specific efforts to 
promote competition. COMPAG gives advice to government bureaux and departments in reviewing policies and 
practices from the competition standpoint, and in proposing new initiatives to promote competition in different 
sectors. 
5 See COMPAG Annual Report (2011-2012), available at 
http://www.compag.gov.hk/report/Compag_Report_2011-12_Eng.pdf 
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In July 2015, the HKCC published its Guideline on the First Conduct Rule (“Guideline”), 
along with five other guidelines on (i) the Second Conduct Rule, (ii) mergers, (iii) complaints, 
(iv) investigations, and (v) exclusions and exemptions. The HKCC is of the view that while 
generally less harmful to competition as compared to horizontal agreements, some vertical 
agreements may, nonetheless, cause harm to competition. 
The Guideline defines RPM in the following way: RPM occurs whenever a supplier 
establishes a fixed or minimum resale price to be observed by the distributor when it resells the 
product affected by the RPM obligation. The Guideline also makes a distinction between direct 
RPM and indirect RPM. RPM can be achieved indirectly, for instance, by fixing the distributor’s 
margin or the maximum level of discount the distributor can grant from a prescribed price level. 
The supplier might also make the grant of rebates or the reimbursement of promotional costs 
subject to the observance of a given price level by the distributor, or link the prescribed resale 
price to the resale price of competitors. The supplier might equally use threats, intimidation, 
warnings, penalties, delays in, or the outright suspension of, deliveries to achieve RPM. While 
having no legal binding effect, the Guideline sets out how the HKCC intends to interpret and 
give effect to the First Conduct Rule. 
Schedule I to the Ordinance contains a general exclusion for agreements of lesser 
significance. Pursuant to that provision, the First Conduct Rule does not apply to an agreement 
between undertakings (or a concerted practice engaged in by undertakings) in any calendar year 
if the combined turnover of the undertakings does not exceed HK$200 million (approximately 
U.S. $25.8 million). Here turnover means the total gross revenues of an undertaking, whether 
obtained in or outside Hong Kong. 
However, this general exclusion rule is not available to agreements that are deemed to 
concern "serious anti-competitive conduct." The list of "serious anti-competitive conduct” 
includes price-fixing, market-sharing, production/sales quota, bid-rigging, and RPM in some 
cases, as we shall see below. 
There is also a general exclusion for agreements enhancing overall economic efficiency in 
Schedule 1 to the Ordinance. 
A. The Theories of Competit ion Harms about RPM 
The Guideline (paragraph 6.72) states that RPM can restrict competition in a number of 
ways: 
i. RPM facilitates coordination between competing suppliers through enhanced price 
transparency in the market. 
ii. RPM undermines suppliers’ incentives to lower prices to distributors and distributors’ 
incentives to negotiate lower wholesale prices. 
iii. RPM limits “intra-brand” price competition by restricting the ability of distributors to 
offer lower sales prices for the affected brand as compared with prices offered by 
competing distributors of the same brand. This will be a particular concern where there 
are strong or well-organized distributors operating in a market. RPM facilitates 
coordination between distributors on the downstream market affected by the RPM. 
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iv.  RPM prevents the emergence of new market participants at the distributor level and will 
generally hinder the expansion of distribution models based on low prices (for example, 
the emergence of discounter distributors). 
v. Where RPM is implemented by a supplier with market power, this may have the effect of 
excluding smaller suppliers from the market. Distributors are incentivized to only 
promote the product affected by the RPM causing harm to consumers. 
Theory (i) and the second part of theory (iii) above are the conventional concerns over 
RPM—that they can be used by upstream suppliers to facilitate upstream collusion or by 
downstream distributors—which are recognized and accepted by most antitrust jurisdictions in 
the world. The HKCC further adds that, in those contexts, it may have particular concern where 
RPM is employed by multiple suppliers in the market, RPM is otherwise common, or where 
there is evidence that the RPM conduct is distributor driven. 
Regarding theory (iii), the Guideline clarifies that the HKCC interprets the First Conduct 
Rule as prohibiting not only restrictions on inter-brand competition but also restrictions on 
intra-brand competition (footnote 38). This position is reflected in other parts of the Guideline 
as well. When evaluating agreements on exclusive distribution and exclusive customer allocation, 
the HKCC will assess how intra-brand and inter-brand competition is affected (paragraph 6.86). 
One may try to make sense of the emphasis on intra-brand competition, as well as inter-
brand competition, in the following way. In a small economy like that of Hong Kong, where 
downstream retailing markets tend to be concentrated due to geographic constraints, perhaps the 
need to protect intra-brand competition becomes greater compared to large economies where 
protection of inter-brand competition is perhaps more important.6 
Theory (iv) above, namely that RPM may be used to deter entry at the resale level, can be 
understood to reflect the concerns in the real RPM cases in Hong Kong whereby larger 
supermarkets pressured suppliers to impose RPM on new/discounted retailers. 
Theory (v), namely that larger suppliers may use RPM to reduce retailer incentives to 
carry competing products, particularly from smaller rivals or new entrants, is also a sensible one. 
This theory of competition harm was discussed in the Leegin case where the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted a series of potential sources of competitive harm, including that a manufacturer with 
market power, by comparison, might use resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive 
not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new entrants.7  
This competition concern has been confirmed in a formalized equilibrium analysis by 
Asker & Bar-Isaac who developed a game-theoretical model which predicts that RPM, slotting 
fees, loyalty rebates, and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to 
transfer profits to retailers.8 If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition 
                                                
6 For emphasis on inter-brand competition, see, e.g., K.G. Elzinga, & D.E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (K. G. Elzinga & D. E. Mills, eds., 2008). 
7 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
8 J. Asker & H. Bar-Isaac, Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, 104(2) 
AMER. ECON. REV. 672-686 (2014). 
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could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers. Thus, in 
equilibrium, retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent’s 
profits. Consequently, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. The 
HKCC is to be applauded for having incorporated the most up-to-date insight and development 
in industrial economics into the Guideline. 
B. “Near Per Se I l legal Approach” Toward RPM 
From the published Guideline and earlier statements of the HKCC about its draft 
guidelines, it appears that HKCC has adopted a “near per se illegal approach” toward RPM. 
The HKCC initially viewed RPM as per se illegal, based on the above five theories of 
harms on competition. The Draft Guideline on the First Conduct Rule, published on October 9, 
2014, stated, “where an agreement involves direct or indirect RPM, the Commission takes the 
view that the arrangement has the object of harming competition” (paragraph 6.64). During the 
public consultation period, the HKCC received 64 submissions from the business sector, trade 
associations, political parties, and public organizations etc., expressing views towards the 
published draft guidelines. A majority of the submissions were about the Draft Guideline on the 
First Conduct Rule, centering on such issues as RPM, information exchange among competitors, 
and collective bargaining. 
The HKCC’s position toward RPM has changed somewhat, as reflected in the Revised 
Guidelines on the First Conduct Rule, published on March 30, 2015. There, the HKCC stipulated 
that RPM is harmful to competition, although the practice may not always have the object of 
harming competition. Depending on the content of the agreement, its implementation, and the 
relevant context, an RPM arrangement may be assessed on the basis of its effects. 
In its press release on the revised guidelines, the HKCC stated that it “maintains its view 
that RPM arrangements have an inherent potential to harm competition in Hong Kong. The 
Commission considers that RPM may have the object of harming competition and there may be 
circumstances when it amounts to Serious Anti-competitive Conduct.” The revised guidelines 
contain additional examples of situations where RPM arrangements will be assessed as having 
the object of harming competition and/or where they might amount to "serious anti-competitive 
conduct." 
In the final version of the Guideline published on July 27, 2015, the HKCC maintains that 
“for the reasons set out in paragraph 6.72 of this Guideline, where an agreement involves direct 
or indirect RPM, the Commission takes the view that the arrangement may have the object of 
harming competition.” However, whether this is in fact the case turns on a consideration of the 
content of the agreement establishing the RPM, the way the arrangement is implemented by the 
parties, and the relevant context. If an RPM agreement does not have the object of harming 
competition, the HKCC will assess whether the RPM causes harm to competition by way of its 
effects.  
The Guideline recognizes that vertical price restrictions, including RPM, may sometimes 
lead to efficiencies. While efficiencies must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, the Guideline 
provides one scenario where RPM can improve upon efficiency. In particular, the Guideline 
states that the RPM may help address the so-called free riding problems at the distribution level 
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where the extra margin guaranteed by the RPM structure encourages parties to provide certain 
sales services for the benefit of consumers. The Guideline further elaborates that this efficiency 
may have some relevance in the case of “experience” goods or complex products. 
While this recognition of a possible pro-competitive effect of RPM is in line with the 
development of modern industrial economics and international best practice, the HKCC 
emphasizes that “the Commission would expect to see compelling evidence of an actual free rider 
problem.” 
C. RPM as Serious Anticompetit ive Conduct 
The Guideline provides an example of RPM having the object of harming competition. 
“For example, RPM will be considered as having the object of harming competition if there is 
evidence that the RPM was implemented by a supplier in response to pressure from a distributor 
seeking to limit competition from competitors of the distributor at the resale level.” This 
situation is illustrated in more detail in Hypothetic Example 16 of the Guideline: 
HomeStore is the owner of a wide number of household goods shops across Hong 
Kong. HomeStore is a significant customer of CleanUpCo for a number of daily 
use products which are widely available in supermarkets, convenience stores, 
specialist stores and smaller shops. 
HomeStore is concerned that its competitors, including other large chain stores 
and smaller independent stores, are offering CleanUpCo’s products at a lower 
price than HomeStore. HomeStore is concerned that its competitors’ pricing 
decisions will impact on the profitability of a number of important business lines 
in its stores. HomeStore therefore pressures CleanUpCo to require its customers 
to sell CleanUpCo products across Hong Kong at a fixed retail price determined 
by CleanUpCo. As HomeStore is a significant customer of CleanUpCo, 
CleanUpCo implements the RPM policy. 
The HKCC would view this arrangement as having the object of harming competition. 
The Guideline explains its reasoning behind this view as follows: “HomeStore’s insistence on 
CleanUpCo introducing a fixed retail price across Hong Kong has an inherent ability to harm 
competition. In this scenario, the purpose of the arrangement is merely to protect HomeStore 
from the competitive pricing of its competitors.” In addition, the Guideline further elaborates 
that there would be unlikely to be sufficient justifications for the RPM practice to satisfy the 
terms of the general exclusion for agreements enhancing overall economic efficiency. 
This example is almost identical in nature to the RPM complaints received by the 
COMPAG in 2012 as mentioned earlier. The Guideline in this part clearly targets the type of 
RPM that has been observed in Hong Kong’s supermarket sector. 
The Guideline further states that “[t]he Commission would also consider the RPM in the 
example to be Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct under the Ordinance,” making it join the 
category of hard-core cartel agreements (price-fixing, market division, production/sales quota, 
and bid-rigging). This classification has strong implication because the general exclusion for 
agreements of lesser significance as mentioned earlier does not apply to agreements considered 
to be "serious anti-competitive conduct" under the Ordinance. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
RPM has been common in Hong Kong and received great attention both before and after 
Hong Kong enacted the Competition Ordinance in 2012. The HKCC’s position toward RPM, 
and its theories of harms as spelled out in the Guideline on the First Conduct Rule, are generally 
in line with both insight from modern industrial economics and international best practices. 
While recognizing the possible pro-competitive effect of RPM, however, the HKCC seems to 
have adopted a “near per se illegal approach” toward RPM by requiring “compelling evidence of 
an actual free-rider problem” in an RPM defense. The HKCC also emphasizes the need to protect 
both intra-brand competition and inter-brand competition. 
 Given the high attention received by RPM in Hong Kong historically and the fact that the 
retailing industry (not including the upstream markets) amounts to about 4 percent of Hong 
Kong’s total employment, and about 10 percent of its GDP, one would not be surprised to see 
immediate enforcement action against RPM after the Ordinance comes into force in December 
2015. 
